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1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 45 - EVIDENCE
CPLR 4503(a): Notwithstanding claim of attorney-client privilege,
attorney may be compelled under exigent circumstances to reveal
client's address in collateral proceeding to enforce a judgment
The attorney-client privilege, as embodied in CPLR 4503(a),
prevents the disclosure of confidential communications made by a
client to his attorney in the course of the professional relationship,
unless the client has waived the privilege.' During the pendency
of a civil litigation, CPLR 3118 permits one party to compel another
party to disclose his address.16 Recently, the issue arose whether,
Id. at 56, 133 N.E.2d at 695-96, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82. The pro se status of the plaintiff, id.
at 56, 133 N.E.2d at 695, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 181, may have influenced the Dulberg Court,
however.
There may be cases where a defendant will be severely prejudiced by denying summary
judgment and allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Cf. DeFabio v. Nadler Rental
Serv., Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 931, 278 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep't 1967) (party waits an
"inexcusably long period of time"); Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 273, 253
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1964) (lapse of time bars plaintiff relief from another
party). See also CPLR 3025, commentary at 477-78 (1974).
"I' CPLR 4503(a) provides in pertinent part:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential commu-
nication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the course of
professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such commu-
nication, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose such communication, in any
action .. .or . . .proceeding ....
CPLR 4503(a) (Pam. 1979).
The attorney-client privilege against nonconsensual disclosure of confidential communi-
cations is considered necessary to promote full disclosure between an attorney and his client.
E. FisCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 516, at 336-38 (2d ed. 1977); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVMENcE § 2290,
at 543 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Be-
tween Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL.. L. REv. 487 (1928); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1977). The
privilege has been deemed to exist:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
J. WiGMORE, supra, § 2292, at 554 (emphasis and footnote omitted). An attorney-client rela-
tionship must exist before the privilege of confidentiality may attach. Id. §§ 2300-2304, at
580-87; E. FisCH, supra, § 519, at 341-42; see People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County
Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 718, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 368 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affl'd, 242 App. Div.
611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934).
"I CPLR 3118 states in part:
A party may serve on any party a written notice demanding a verified statement
setting forth the post office address and residence of the party . . . and of any
person who possessed a cause of action or defense asserted in the action which has
been assigned.
CPLR 3118 (1970).
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after an action has terminated, the attorney-client privilege protects
a client's address from disclosure efforts directed against the attor-
ney. In In re Jacqueline F.,'' the Court of Appeals held that an
attorney who had represented the unsuccessful party in a custody
proceeding was required to reveal his client's address in a subse-
quent collateral action in order to facilitate the enforcement of the
custody decree.'62
In re Jacqueline F. involved protracted proceedings in which
the natural parents of Jacqueline F. sought to obtain physical cus-
tody of their child after voluntarily placing her in the care of her
aunt.6 3 The Bronx County Surrogate ordered the aunt to return the
child to her natural parents.' While the order of the surrogate's
court was stayed pending appeal to the appellate division, the aunt
absconded with the infant to Puerto Rico.' 5 The appellate division
unanimously affirmed the surrogate's order, 6 and the Court of Ap-
peals denied a motion for leave to appeal.'6 Subsequently, the sur-
rogate's court granted the parents' application to compel the aunt's
attorney to disclose his client's address in Puerto Rico.' 6 The Appel-
CPLR 3118 is a recodification of Rule 9-a of the Civil Practice Act. CPA 9-a; see SixTH
REP. 319; FiFTr REP. 470. CPA 9-a mandated the disclosure of a party's address, upon demand
by another party, in the course of a civil action. See Freedman v. Statewide Mach. Inc., 19
Misc. 2d 930, 192 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1959); Fischer v. Seamen's Church
Inst., 195 Misc. 2d 471, 92 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), modified on other
grounds, 275 App. Div. 1047, 92 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1949). CPA 9-a represented the statutory
embodiment of the common-law doctrine compelling disclosure of a client's address during
the pendency of the litigation. See, e.g., Markevich v. Royal Ins. Co., 162 App. Div. 640, 147
N.Y.S. 1004 (2d Dep't 1914); Richards v. Richards, 64 Misc. 285, 119 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1909), aff'd, 143 App. Div. 906, 127 N.Y.S. 1141 (1st Dep't 1911); O'Connor v.
O'Connor, 62 Misc. 53, 115 N.Y.S. 965 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1909); Walton v. Fairchild, 4
N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1889).
151 47 N.Y.2d 215, 391 N.E.2d 967, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1979), aff'g sub nom. In re
Fernandez, 65 App. Div. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't 1978).
112 47 N.Y.2d at 223, 391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
"' In 1971, the infant's natural parents voluntarily placed her in the care of her paternal
aunt because of an illness suffered by the child's mother. Id. at 217, 391 N.E.2d at 968, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 885. Following the aunt's refusal to return Jacqueline, the parents commenced
a family court action in 1975 seeking the release of the child. The proceeding was dismissed
since the aunt previously had obtained letters of guardianship over the child, giving the
surrogate's court exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Id. Subsequently, Jacqueline's par-
ents initiated a proceeding in the Bronx County Surrogate's Court to revoke the letters of
guardianship. Id. at 217-18, 391 N.E.2d at 968-69, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86.
' Id. at 217, 391 N.E.2d at 968, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
,15 Id. at 218, 391 N.E.2d at 969, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 886. Upon learning of the aunt's
departure with the child, the parents moved to vacate the stay, but the motion was denied
when the aunt's attorney explained that she was on vacation. Id.
"I In re Fernandez, 59 App. Div. 2d 1064, 399 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1977).
167 47 N.Y.2d at 218, 391 N.E.2d at 969, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
I's In re Jacqueline F., 94 Misc. 2d 96, 97,404 N.Y.S.2d 790,791 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County),
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late Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed without
opinion.' 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.' 0 Writing for the
majority, Judge Jasen " I noted that since "the attorney-client privi-
lege constitutes an 'obstacle' to the truth-finding process,"17 2 claims
of the privilege should be scrutinized to assure that it is applied only
where it is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting full disclo-
sure between the attorney and his client.7 3 Asserting that the exist-
ence of the privilege is contingent upon the circumstances of the
particular case,'7 4 the majority emphasized that only communica-
tions made confidentially to the attorney in order to obtain legal
advice are protected.'7 5 Turning to the situation involved in
Jacqueline F., the majority found that the client's address was not
privileged since it was not disclosed in confidence for a legitimate
purpose but rather to hinder the enforcement of the surrogate's
judgment that custody should be awarded to the natural parents., 6
The Court determined that it would be impermissible, after subject-
ing the child to the "unfortunate but often necessary" ordeal of a
custody proceeding, to allow the unsuccessful party to circumvent
aff'd mem., 65 App. Div. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 215,
391 N.E.2d 967, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1979). This proceeding was commenced on the same day
that the Court of Appeals had denied the aunt's motion for leave to appeal the surrogate's
direction that she return the child to her parents. 47 N.Y.2d at 218, 391 N.E.2d at 969, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 886. An additional request to hold the aunt in contempt for failure to comply
with the court's custody decree was refused by the surrogate's court due to improper service
of process. 94 Misc. 2d at 97, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
In re Fernandez, 65 App. Div. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.).
' 47 N.Y.2d at 223, 391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
,7, Judge Jasen was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli and Wachtler.
Filing a separate opinion, Judge Jones concurred in the result. Judge Fuchsberg dissented in
a separate opinion.
1 47 N.Y.2d at 219, 391 N.E.2d at 969, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
m Id. at 219, 391 N.E.2d at 969, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (citations omitted).
,7 Id. at 222, 391 N.E.2d at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888 (quoting In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d
214, 219, 168 N.E.2d 660, 662, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (1960) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 2313 at 609 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
,75 47 N.Y.2d at 219, 391 N.E.2d at 970, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
,,' Id. at 222, 391 N.E.2d at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. According to the Court,
[w]here a calculated intent to frustrate a court mandate exists on the part of a
client under the circumstances of this case, it matters little whether his or her
attorney acted for a legitimate purpose, inasmuch as a finding of a "conspiracy" is
not necessary to defeat the privilege.
Id. at 222, 391 N.E.2d at 971-72, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15 (1933); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 417 (10th ed. 1973)); see People ex rel. Vogelstein
v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affl'd, 242
App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934).
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the final decree.' The attorney-client privilege, therefore, had to
"yield to the best interests of the child."'75 The majority also found
that CPLR 3118 was not controlling, because the statute has no
application "once the litigation ha[s] terminated, a judgment [has
been] rendered and the appellate process [has been] ex-
hausted."'' 71 Moreover, the Court stated that neither CPLR 3118 nor
its common law precursor' negated the possibility that a client's
address may sometimes be protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. 18
Concurring in the result, Judge Jones maintained that only in
the "most unusual case" could a client's address be held privileged,
for it rarely would be material to resolving the merits of a dispute.8 2
Concluding that the address involved in the Jacqueline F. con-
troversy was not privileged,' Judge Jones stated that, under CPLR
3118, the attorney could be compelled to disclose his client's address
in the parents' effort to facilitate the enforcement of the surrogate's
mandate.'" The concurring judge rejected the majority's contention
that the litigation had terminated,'85 declaring that the instant ac-
177 47 N.Y.2d at 222, 391 N.E.2d at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89.
171 Id. at 223, 391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889 (citing People ex rel. Chitty v.
Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963)). See note 194
infra.
71 47 N.Y.2d at 220, 391 N.E.2d at 970, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 887. According to the majority,
the litigation during which the attorney had acted as counsel to the aunt had terminated
when the aunt's motion for leave to appeal had been denied by the Court of Appeals. Id. at
221, 391 N.E.2d at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888. But see notes 185 & 186 and accompanying text
infra. See generally note 168 supra.
"' See, e.g., Hyman v. Corgil Realty Co., 164 App. Div. 140, 149 N.Y.S. 493 (1st Dep't
1914); In re Trainor, 146 App. Div. 117, 130 N.Y.S. 682 (1st Dep't 1911); Neugass v. Terminal
Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y.S. 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931); Walton v. Fairchild,
4 N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1889). See generally note 160 supra.
"1 47 N.Y.2d at 220, 391 N.E.2d at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. The Court stated that
the principle underlying CPLR 3118 and the case law on which it is based is that, "although
[a client's address may be] privileged, it must be disclosed in the course of a pending action
where disclosure is necessary for the proper administration of justice." Id. at 221, 391 N.E.2d
at 971, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
11 Id. at 224, 391 N.E.2d at 973, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Jones, J., concurring).
13 Id. (Jones, J., concurring). Since the address had no relevance to the determination
of who should get custody of the child but was requested only to bring about the enforcement
of the final decree, Judge Jones found that the address had no evidentiary characteristics and,
therefore, was not a privileged communication. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 225, 391 N.E.2d at 973, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91 (Jones, J., concurring). Contrary
to the majority, Judge Jones opined that the duty to reveal the address, as set forth in CPLR
3118, "exists entirely without regard to the existence of any evidentiary privilege under CPLR
4503(a)." Id. at 224, 391 N.E.2d at 973, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Jones, J., concurring). But see
note 181 and accompanying text supra.
I' Id. at 225, 391 N.E.2d at 973, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (Jones, J., concurring). But see
note 179 and accompanying text supra.
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tion was "incidental to the custody proceeding," which could not be
considered closed "[u]ntil enforcement ha[d] been effected.' ' 8
Finally, notwithstanding that CPLR 3118, by its terms, is directed
to demands made between parties, Judge Jones found no plausible
reason for not also binding a party's attorney to the statutory duty
to disclose. '
Judge Fuchsberg dissented, concluding that the circumstances
presented in Jacqueline F. did not outweigh the policy of full disclo-
sure underlying the attorney-client privilege. ' Addressing CPLR
3118, the dissenting Judge stated that the demand, "though...
addressed to the lawyer, . . . is substantively . . . made on the
client." ' Observing that only the client can decide whether to re-
veal the address or suffer the penalties for noncompliance,'90 Judge
Fuchsberg posited that the attorney has no authority to disclose
such information without his client's consent. 9'
It is submitted that the Jacqueline F. Court's interpretation of
the attorney-client privilege both preserves the proper function of
the privilege'92 and denies its availability to those who would employ
it to interfere with the administration of justice.'93 Just as prior
"I' Id. at 225-26, 391 N.E.2d at 973-74, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91 (Jones, J., concurring).
Judge Jones apparently viewed disclosure of the aunt's address by her attorney as an exercise
of the court's responsibility to ensure enforcement of its earlier custody determination. See
id. at 226, 391 N.E.2d at 974, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (Jones, J., concurring). The concurring
Judge questioned the procedural authority of the Court to mandate disclosure if the order
were not viewed as such. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
" Id. at 224, 391 N.E.2d at 973, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (Jones, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 227-28, 391 N.E.2d at 975, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
ja Id. at 228, 391 N.E.2d at 975, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 229, 391 N.E.2d at 976, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); see
note 199 infra.
"1 47 N.Y.2d at 229, 391 N.E.2d at 976, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Making an analogy to the Government, Judge Fuchsberg pointed out that litigants often opt
to forego the lawsuit rather than reveal evidence they prefer to keep confidential. Id. (Fuchs-
berg, J., dissenting). The dissenting Judge maintained that, when a client is willing to suffer
the sanctions imposed for his refusal to disclose evidence, the attorney should not be able to
go against his client's wishes and answer a CPLR 3118 demand. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissent-
ing).
192 For a discussion of the purpose of the attorney-client privilege see note 159 supra.
"I In People ex reL Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affl'd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934), an
attorney was summoned before a grand jury and asked to reveal the name and address of the
person who had retained him to represent the defendants in a criminal prosecution. 150 Misc.
at 715, 270 N.Y.S. at 365. Finding that the attorney's clients had retained him in order to
continue a scheme to violate the law, the court rejected the attorney's claim of privilege since
"it was not the purpose of the privilege to shield guilt." Id. at 717, 270 N.Y.S. at 367. The
court stated that under the circumstances of the case "the injury that would result to the
correct and orderly administration of justice would be immeasurably greater than the benefit
1979]
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dispositions have turned on the facts peculiar to each case,'"4 the
Court emphasized that the circumstances present in Jacqueline F.
- the client's intent to thwart the enforcement of a court decree and
the welfare of a child - rendered it inappropriate to recognize the
privilege.15 It is suggested, however, that Jacqueline F. should not
be read as supporting the principle that a client's motive to frustrate
a judicial order alone is sufficient to negate the existence of the
privilege, since the need to protect the best interests of the child
apparently was critical to the Court's refusal to uphold the privi-
lege.'99 Where alternative means for obtaining nonevidentiary ma-
terial necessary to enforce a judicial mandate involving so vital a
concern as the welfare of a child are either unavailable or would
impose an unreasonable burden upon the party seeking enforce-
ment, as in Jacqueline F., it is submitted that the privilege should
that would enure to the relation of attorney and client." Id. at 721, 270 N.Y.S. at 370. Thus,
where the privilege is invoked for unlawful purposes, "[t]he privilege vanishes [if] the
relation giving rise to it is abused by the client." Id. at 721, 270 N.Y.S. at 371. Furthermore,
the Vogelstein court determined that whether or not the attorney knew of the client's illegal
purpose was irrelevant to the claim of privilege. Id. at 721, 270 N.Y.S. at 371. After Vogelstein,
it seemed as though the identity of the client would never be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 59 Misc. 2d 149, 150-51, 298 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969). In In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d
836 (1960), however, a unanimous Court of Appeals held that a client's identity could fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the client had contacted the attorney in order to "aid
[in] a public purpose to expose wrongdoing and not. . . to conceal wrongdoing." Id. at 218,
168 N.E.2d at 661, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
"I See In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 219, 168 N.E.2d 660, 662, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839
(1960).
"1 47 N.Y.2d at 222-23, 391 N.E.2d at 971-72, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. The Jacqueline
F. Court balanced the client's intent, which it found to be solely to hinder the enforcement
of the custody decree, id. at 222, 391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889, with the other
circumstances of the case, and determined that it could not tolerate the client's use of the
privilege for an unlawful purpose where the welfare of the child was at stake. Id. at 222-23,
391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
"1 47 N.Y.2d at 222-23, 391 N.E.2d at 972, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 889. Where the custody of a
child is concerned, the courts frequently emphasize the State's parens patriae interest and,
tend to favor full disclosure. Id. In Tierney v. Flower, 32 App. Div. 2d 392, 302 N.Y.S.2d 640
(2d Dep't 1969), the plaintiff brought a proceeding to compel the disclosure of the identity of
the couple who had privately adopted her child as part of her effort to revoke her prior written
consent to the adoption. Id. at 394-95, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43. In affirming the lower court's
disclosure order, the appellate division held that a claim of confidential privilege should not
be sustained where the "safe and proper custody of a child is involved." Id. at 395, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 643. The Tierney court declared that the "overriding concern with the welfare
of the infant as a ward of the court overbalances any interest of technical claim . . . with
respect to the confidential relationship between him and his clients." Id. at 395, 302 N.Y.S.2d
at 643; accord, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 59 Misc. 2d 149, 298 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1969); Falkenhainer v. Falkenhainer, 198 Misc. 29, 97 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1950).
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yield. Caution should be exercised, however, where less drastic
means for aquiring the information are at hand or the interests of a
child are not at stake, notwithstanding the client's intent to hinder
the administration of justice. In such a situation, alternative
avenues should be pursued to avoid an unwarranted intrusion into
the confidentiality between a lawyer and his client.'97
In addition, it is submitted that the majority correctly deter-
mined that CPLR 3118 does not remove a client's address from the
scope of the attorney-client privilege.'98 Rather, it is suggested that
CPLR 3118 stands as no bar to the invocation of the privilege, since
the express language of the statute is directed at the parties to the
action, not their attorneys.'99 In the course of the litigation, the
client controls the decision whether to release his address upon de-
mand or incur the sanctions available to compel compliance with
the statute.2 0 Once the action has terminated, however, disclosure
'" It is submitted that the devices provided in the CPLR for enforcing judgments should
be utilized instead of violating the attorney-client privilege. See CPLR arts. 51 & 52; notes
200 & 201 infra.
" It would also appear Judge Jasen's statement that the common-law background of
CPLR 3118 did not consider the client's address as being outside the scope of the privilege in
all circumstances is consistent with prior case law. These cases generally held that the only
situation where the client's address was not protected by the privilege was during the pen-
dency of an action to which-the client was a party and disclosure was required in the interests
of justice. In re Trainor, 146 App. Div. 117, 130 N.Y.S. 682 (1st Dep't 1911); Neugass v.
Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y.S. 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931); Walton v.
Fairchild, 4 N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1889). For example, a client's address
received the benefit of the privilege once the attorney-client relationship had ceased because
the attorney was bound by the "confidence imposed by the original relation." In re Trainor,
146 App. Div. 117, 120, 130 N.Y.S. 682, 684 (1st Dep't 1911); Walton v. Fairchild, 4 N.Y.S.
552, 552 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1889). In addition, the attorney could not be compelled
to reveal his client's address in order to facilitate future lawsuits against the client. Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 702, 249 N.Y.S. 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931);
Walton v. Fairchild, 4 N.Y.S. 552, 552 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1889). A client's identity
or address has been held to be privileged where such information was superfluous to the
substantive basis of the suit. See In re Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
' CPLR 3118 (1970); note 159 supra.
See 47 N.Y.2d at 228-29, 391 N.E.2d at 975-76, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting); CPLR 3126 (1970 & Supp. 1979-1980); SIo.L § 365, at 461; 3A WK&M § 3118.02.
A common denominator of the provisions available under the CPLR to compel compliance
with CPLR 3118 is that all sanctions are directed against the parties, not their attorneys. For
example, CPLR 3124 provides, inter alia, that application may be made to the court to
compel compliance with a "demand for address under rule 3118." CPLR 3124 (1970); see
CPLR 3124, commentary at 625-33 (1970). CPLR 3126 empowers the court to impose civil
sanctions upon parties who refuse to obey disclosure orders or who willfully disregard compli-
ance with disclosure requests. See CPLR 3124, commentary at 631-32 (1970). These devices
are limited to the pending action and terminate upon its completion. CPLR 3102(d) (1970).
CPLR 5104 (1978), however, permits the issuance of a civil contempt order upon parties who
refuse to comply with the enforcement of a judgment. This provision is augmented by other
1979]
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efforts directed at the former party's attorney would transfer the
burden to counsel alone either to comply and breach a confidence
or not comply and personally face a contempt order.0'1 It is sug-
gested that it is unlikely that the statute contemplated such a re-
sult.
It is submitted that the Jacqueline F. majority neither dero-
gated the principles upon which the attorney-client privilege is
based nor diluted the strength of the privilege itself. Nevertheless,
in the absence of potential harm to a child's welfare, it is suggested
that the privilege should not be disregarded even where nondisclo-
sure of the client's address may serve to evade a court order. Con-
ceivably, resort to available enforcement procedures in that in-
stance may be sufficient to compel disclosure.Z
Annette L. Guarino
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW
GML § 50-e: Time period for claimant to apply for permission to
serve late notice of claim not tolled by infancy under CPLR 208
Where a notice of claim is required by statute'03 as a condition
devices available in article 52 of the CPLR for the enforcement of money judgments. See, e.g.,
CPLR 5222, 5251 (1978).
"I See CPLR 5104 (1978); SIEGEL §§ 482-483, at 644-46. With respect to the enforcement
of child custody decrees, the contempt remedy is available to "uphold judicial process and
the reasonable expectations of those who turn to it." Id. § 481, at 645; see People ex rel.
Feldman v. Warden, 46 App. Div. 2d 256, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1974), aff'd mem., 36
N.Y.2d 846, 331 N.E.2d 631, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975) (foster mother who willfully refused to
produce child in custody proceeding, with ability to do so, incarcerated for contempt until
performance of act); SIEGEL, at 644 n.24.
20 See notes 196, 200 & 201 supra.
The primary purpose of modern notice of claim statutes is to permit prompt and
efficient investigation of claims against municipalities. See, e.g., Beary v. City of Rye, 44
N.Y.2d 398, 412-13, 377 N.E.2d 453, 458, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13-14 (1978); Adkins v. City of New
York, 43 N.Y.2d 346, 350, 372 N.E.2d 311, 312, 401 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (1977); Board of Educ.
v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 483, 166 N.E.2d 666, 669, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1960).
Although the scope of section 50-e is limited to tort suits, contract actions against municipali-
ties may also entail the mandatory service of a timely notice of claim. See, e.g., Flanagan v.
Board of Educ., 63 App. Div. 2d 1013, 406 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 613, 393 N.E.2d 991, 419 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1979); Shulga v. Lewin, 415
N.Y.S.2d 765 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1979); CPLR 9802; N.Y. Enuc. LAW § 3813(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAW § 85.10 (McKinney Pam. 1971-1979);
N.Y. ToWN LAW § 65(3) (McKinney 1965); NEW YoRK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 16, § 394a-1.0
(1976). If there is no express statutory provision, service of a notice of claim is not a pre-
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precedent" 4 to the commencement of a tort action against a public
corporation, section 50-e of the General Municipal Law mandates
that the notice be served within 90 days from the time the cause of
action accrues.2 05 Prior to the amendment of subdivision 5 of section
50-e in 1976, courts had discretion to grant leave to serve a late
notice only when the application was made within 1 year of the
accrual of the plaintiff's claim, the 1-year period not subject to
tolling by reason of a claimant's infancy.0 ' As amended, the subdi-
requisite to the maintenance of an action. See Meed v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 70 Misc.
2d 274, 332 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
The constitutionality of notice of claim statutes in general, and as applied to infants,
has been repeatedly upheld. See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866
(1952); MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 187 N.Y. 37, 79 N.E. 863 (1907); Paulsey v.
Chaloner, 54 App. Div. 2d 131, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35 (3d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed mem., 41
N.Y.2d 900, 362 N.E.2d 641, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977); Guarrera v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp.,
51 App. Div. 2d 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d 161 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d 942, 386
N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1976).
2" A condition precedent is an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which must exist
or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a promise arises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 250 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1932).
As applied to tort claims under § 50-e of the General Municipal Law, service of a timely notice
of claim is required before the municipal entity "performs its promise" to allow suits against
itself. See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 485, 104 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1952). Ordinar-
ily, a failure to perform a condition precedent may be excused. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
676 (3d ed. 1961); see Winter v. City of Niagara Falls, 190 N.Y. 198, 204, 82 N.E. 1101, 1102
(1907). Types of excuses include impossibility, waiver, and estoppel. S. WILLISTON, supra. In
Winter, the Court doubted that the requirement of serving a notice of claim could be waived
by the authorities. 190 N.Y. at 204, 82 N.E. at 1103. Recently, however, the Court of Appeals
held that a defendant may be estopped from asserting a defense of untimely service of a notice
of claim where a claimant changes his position to his detriment in justifiable reliance on the
actions of a governmental subdivision. Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38
N.Y.2d 662, 668, 345 N.E.2d 561, 564, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (1976), rev'g 46 App. Div. 2d
898, 361 N.Y.S.2d 939 (2d Dep't 1974), and modifying Economou v. New York City Health
& Hosps. Corp., 47 App. Div. 2d 877, 366 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't 1975); see Scibilia v. City
of Niagara Falls, 44 App. Div. 2d 757, 757, 354 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (4th Dep't 1974); Johnson
v. Board of Educ., 33 App. Div. 2d 647, 647, 305 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (4th Dep't 1969).
Section 50-e(1)(a) of the General Municipal Law provides in pertinent part:
In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a
condition precedent to the commencement of an action. . . against a public corpo-
ration . . . the notice of claim shall comply with and be served in accordance with
the provisions of this section within ninety days after the claim arises.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1977).
Section 50-e itself does not require service of a notice of claim as a condition precedent
to maintaining a tort action against a public corporation. Preliminary notices of claim are
mandated by numerous general, special and local laws scattered throughout the state. For a
partial compilation of such laws, see Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e
of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes, TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun.
CONFERENCE, 358, 420-27 (1976). Section 50-e was enacted to provide uniform time and proce-
dural requirements for these statutes. Martin v. School Board, 301 N.Y. 233, 235, 93 N.E.2d
655, 655 (1950).
m' The requirement under the prior law that leave to serve a late notice of claim could
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